This section discusses additional robustness checks to the analyis included in the main paper. Section 9.1 re-estimates trade elasticities relying on implicit tariff rates that account for corruption before and after the tariff change, section 9.2 shows that the corruption analysis is insensitive to the removal of clearing agent fixed effects and section 9.3 discusses the potential displacement effects of corruption in more detail.
A Estimating Trade Elasticities with Implicit Tariff Rates that Account for Corruption
In this section I re-estimate the trade elasticities computed in section 3.1, accounting for the possibility that corruption may have reduced the effective tariff rates faced by firms. According to the audit study described in section 4, prior to the tariff change, products falling under a high tariff category faced an 80 percent probability of paying a bribe. This would allow shippers to reduce in approximately 50 percent the value of the shipment on which tariff duties would be calculated. Based on this information, I adjust the implicit tariff level prior to the tariff change (for years 2006 and 2007) to 60 percent of the nominal tariff rate. Post tariff change, the probability of paying a bribe decreased to 16 percent. I therefore adjust the implicit tariff rate for this period to correspond to 92 percent of the nominal tariff rate.
1 Table 20 , columns 1 through 4, show the estimated elasticities relying on implicit as opposed to nominal tariff rates. Under all specifications, we observe a significant increase in the estimated elasticity. In columns (5) through (8),
I include a control for products that experienced a decrease in the tariff rate in 2008 and in columns (9) through (12) I restrict the analysis to the subset of products that experienced the largest tariff reductions in 2008 (between 7.5 and 20 percent), since these products were more likely to be disproportionately affected by corruption prior to the tariff change. Overall, there is a 24 percent to a five-fold increase in the estimated elasticities relative to the elasticities estimated in section 3.1, which only considered nominal tariff rates. This adjustment would also lead to the estimation of more reasonable gains associated with the tariff reduction. Taken together, these results further suggest that tariff evasion can potentially attenuate estimated trade elasticities. Table 21 shows that the results on the determinants of the probability of paying a bribe are insensitive to the removal of clearing agent fixed effects.
B Clearing Agents Fixed Effects
1 Note that these are back of the envelope calculations that are based on the audit data and on the fact that clearing agents reported a 50 percent rule of thumb reduction in the tariff rate whenever a bribe was paid.
C Additional Displacement Effects
As described in sections 4 and 5.6, bribe payments for tariff avoidance are just a subset of the bribery deals available to border officials and firms during the import process. As officials attempt to protect bribe rents and private agents seek alternative methods to reduce the cost of clearing goods through borders, changes in tariff schedules can affect not only the levels of tariff evasion but also the broader set of corrupt interactions both parties engage in.
2 If these displacement effects are large enough, they could help explain the observed small elasticities.
Section 5.6 discusses the first set of substitution effects observed in the displacement of corruption: products that changed tariff in 2008 were more likely to pay coercive bribes following the tariff change due to irregularities with the documentation. There were no changes in the required documentation for clearance during the period under analysis and the distribution of origin countries for imports remained fairly stable. The clearing agents providing the audit data were the same throughout the study suggesting that irregularities with shipment documentation were more likely to be fictitious than real. This substitution effect in corruption patterns represents a move from collusive forms of corruption -tariff evasion-to coercive bribe extraction in which no substantive part of the rent generated by the illicit transaction is 2 While the potential for policy reform to trigger the displacement of corruption lies at the core of an extensive literature on law enforcement (Reppetto 1976; Chaiken, Lawless and Stevenson 1974; McPheters, Mann, and Schlagenhauf 1984; Ayres and Levitt 1998; Levitt 1998; Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2004) , displacement effects of corruption in the context of trade policy and trade costs have remained largely unexplored with the exception of Yang (2008a Yang ( , 2008b captured by the private firm.
The data further suggest that a second type of displacement effect oc- Following the tariff change, there is also an increase in the number of bribe payments made to port officials outside of customs, at different stages of the clearing process. Data limitations prevent me from firmly establishing whether this result is demand driven, as other border officials become aware of the appropriable bribe surplus created by the reduction in tariff levels; or if it is supply driven, as firms and clearing agents continue to earmark budgets towards facilitating clearance and, given the reduction in tariffs, now have more liquidity to make payments at other stages of the clearing process. Since port officials do not interact with customs' officials and lack full information on each shipment, it is reasonable to assume that they would be unable to precisely identify products that were previously paying high bribes (as discussed in section 4). The effect is therefore more likely to be supply driven. Following the tariff reduction, the percentage of bribe payments made to customs' officials declined to 72 percent, with an increase in payments appropriated by clearing agents to 10 percent, and of 18 percent to other port or border officials. Overall, displacement effects in this particular context were, however, relatively small, dampening the effect of the tariff reduction by less than 10 percent. 
